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When John Kenneth Galbraith 
referred to India as the “world’s greatest 
example of  functioning anarchy”, it was 
no more than a light-hearted aside in an 
article on the economic policy options 
available to the country a decade after its 
independence (Galbraith, 1958). If  more 
than half  a century later the comment 
still finds its way into popular discourse 
it is not because of  any broad based 
ideological shift towards an extreme 
libertarian ideology. The term anarchy 
has rarely been used in a positive sense 
in Indian political discourse. Even when 
the chief  minister of  the short-lived Aam 
Aadmi Party government in the nation’s 
capital city claimed to be an anarchist, it 
took the form of  political repartee rather 
than any meaningful discussion (Some 
say I am an anarchist, yes I am: Arvind 
Kejriwal, 2014). The attractiveness of  the 
term ‘functioning anarchy’ must then lie in 
less theoretically sophisticated domains. It 
is, more often than not, an expression of  
dismay that a country that can achieve high 
growth rates cannot achieve a semblance 
of  order. The unwillingness to accept any 
form of  order imposed by an authority 
from above, and the price that demands, 
is quite evident to even someone passing 
through India’s cities. Chaotic city traffic 
ensures pedestrians pay a price, sometimes 
with their lives (‘Cyclists and pedestrians 
account for over half  of  all road fatalities’, 
2013). It is not unknown for riots to break 
out over statues (Jaoul, 2006). Even in one 
of  the industries the country is most proud 
of— the information technology units in 
Bangalore — there is a divergence between 
the working norms for women in practice 
and that prescribed in law. The nature of  
the industry makes it necessary for women 
to work at night, while the law of  that 
state does not allow it. And this anarchy is 
beginning to take a toll on several elements 
of  basic civic life, including the safety of  
women in Indian cities. 
In the search for an approach that 
will help understand how and why this 
widespread disorder has become deeply 
embedded in Indian cities, this paper falls 
back on the ideas of  one of  India’s most 
celebrated politicians — and possibly 
underrated thinkers — of  the twentieth 
century: MK Gandhi. While Indian 
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officialdom grants him near sainthood 
by referring to him as the Mahatma, the 
tools he used to understand Indian society, 
in the process of  generating what was 
arguably the largest political mobilization 
of  the twentieth century, have not received 
sufficient critical attention. By distilling 
a method from his writings, without at 
the same time offering a predetermined 
commitment to accept all his judgements, 
this paper hopes to develop what can be 
termed a neo-Gandhian approach that will 
help better explain the working of  Indian 
cities, if  not some of  the broader issues in 
understanding urban spaces.
The paper begins with a brief  
exploration of  the nature of  anarchy in 
India’s cities, focusing on the mix of  identity 
politics and gender issues that has become 
increasingly life-threatening. It then outlines 
an interpretation of  Gandhian thought that 
emphasizes his method while deliberately 
ignoring his judgements. In the process 
it uses his concept of  Swadeshi to make 
a distinction between what can be called 
perceptible and imperceptible spaces. The 
paper then goes on to outline the working 
of  this method in the urban sphere. Finally, 
it takes this method back to the challenge 
of  understanding the explosive mixture 
of  identity politics and gender issues that 
threaten to make Indian cities extremely 
difficult for women to live in.
the anarchy oF indian cities
The disregard for authority in Indian 
cities is as widely dispersed across the 
country as it is diverse in nature. Moreh, 
a border town in the state of  Manipur in 
the northeast of  India, is a base for the 
illegal flow of  arms across international 
borders (Lian, 2013). And if  we consider 
such disregard for authority a problem 
confined to remote parts of  the country, 
we need to consider the case of  units in 
Dharavi slum in the centre of  Mumbai 
that process hides for leather exports to 
the developed world under conditions that 
are clearly inhuman (Mahmud, 2010). This 
substantial diversity ensures that each case 
of  the challenge to central authority has its 
own unique features.
While there need not be any clear 
pattern across the various cases of  urban 
practices that challenge centralized 
authority, there are certain instruments 
that can get be used in very different 
situations. Among the more frequently 
used instruments to disregard authority 
imposed from above in urban India is the 
phenomenon of  a Bandh, or complete 
shutdown. A group within an urban 
entity — ranging from a small town to 
the country’s financial capital, Mumbai, 
— can force a complete closure of  all 
activity for a fixed period of  time, usually 
a day. This instrument gained legitimacy 
as a valid tool of  protest against British 
authority in the colonial era, where claims 
could be made that it represented the 
interests of  all Indians against a foreign 
government. The instrument continued 
into the post-independence era as means 
of  protest against the state, even when the 
group calling for a bandh could not claim 
to represent all of  local society. When this 
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conflict, between those calling for a bandh 
and the larger society that was forced to 
pay the price of  a complete shutdown, 
reached the Kerala High Court in 1997 
it ruled that “calling for a bundh by any 
association, organization or political party 
and the enforcing of  that call by it is illegal 
and unconstitutional” (Bharat Kumar and 
Anr vs State of  Kerala and Ors, 1997). The 
Supreme Court of  India upheld the view of  
the Kerala High Court noting that ‘There 
cannot be any doubt that the fundamental 
rights of  the people as a whole cannot be 
subservient to the claim of  fundamental 
right of  an individual or only a section of  
the people” (The Communnist Party of  
India (M) vs Bharat Kumar & ors, 1997).
Despite the strong affirmation of  
the ban on bandhs by the highest court 
in the land the call for bandhs and their 
enforcement has not stopped. If  anything 
it has moved on from the political space 
to the social space. The death of  a film 
star in a southern city can bring about a 
complete closure of  a city. This could be 
termed to be within the political space 
in states like Tamil Nadu where the film 
stars have transformed themselves into 
politicians, but it also occurs in states like 
the neighbouring Karnataka where the 
biggest stars have often chosen to stay 
out of  the political space. The death of  
the Kannada film actor Raj Kumar not 
only resulted in the complete closure of  
Bangalore in April 2006, but also in the loss 
of  several lives in rioting (Murthy, 2006).
Among the trends in Indian cities that 
have spurred the movement of  instruments 
like Bandhs from the political to the social 
space is the growing role of  identity. While 
Indians, like anyone else, have multiple 
identities the urban circumstances in 
individual cities tend to create situations 
where some individual identities become 
more important than others. The political 
and social mobilization around the issue of  
the birthplace of  Lord Ram in the 1990s 
saw a rise in the focus on religious identities 
in several Indian cities (Chibber & Misra, 
1993). The effective merger of  the largely 
Tamil speaking Cantonment areas with the 
Kannada speaking City areas of  Bangalore 
saw a rise in the language identities in that 
city (Nair, 2005). And the significance of  
a particular identity varies not just across 
place but also across time. Bangalore 
which saw bloody language riots has also 
had communal riots at other times (Nair, 
Language and the Right to the City, 2000)
The preoccupation with identity in 
Indian cities has, not entirely surprisingly, 
had its effect on the family and the 
individual as well. Seemingly forgotten 
identities like that of  the gotra have not 
only been revived but turned into an 
instrument of  oppression. The gotra 
is a lineage that is believed to be traced 
over many centuries, and traditionally 
marriage between couples belonging to 
the same gotra is banned. Some caste 
networks have seen the re-emergence of  
resolve to use violent steps to enforce 
the ban on marriage within the same 
gotra. This has resulted in young couples 
being murdered, often with the consent 
of  the parents of  the bride, in what are 
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euphemistically termed “honour killings” 
(Vishwanath & Palakonda, 2011). These 
murders typically have the sanction of  the 
local Khap panchayats. As the decision 
moves back and forth between the family 
domain and the social, an entire discourse 
justifying such killings is built around it. 
And a prominent place in this discourse 
is provided for comments on the dress 
westernised women wear, thereby seeking 
to virtually justify aggression against them 
on the streets. Consequently, women are 
among the most vulnerable to the growing 
anarchy in Indian society.
Understanding this widespread 
disregard for authority to the point of  
large scale disorder comes up against 
several methodological challenges. The 
contributions to this disorder range from 
the level of  individuals to that of  multiple 
identity groups within a society, raising 
questions about the appropriate unit of  
analysis. Again, the fact that the situation 
varies so substantially across both time and 
place makes it difficult, if  not impossible, 
to come up with a single grand theory 
that explains it all. This has sometimes 
led to a more nuanced interpretation 
of  large theoretical frameworks. But it 
is not always clear whether the nuances 
a situation demands are completely 
consistent with the basic premises of  that 
theoretical framework. Alternatively, there 
is a tendency to abandon all- explaining 
grand theories and focus on everyday 
understandings of  specific situations. While 
this approach has provided a literature of  
great empirical value and insights, it does 
not fully address the question of  what 
exactly in the experience of  one situation 
can be taken to understand another. It is 
in order to find an approach that meets 
the twin challenges of  identifying the 
appropriate level of  analysis and addressing 
the variation situations provide that we 
turn to an interpretation of  Gandhi’s ideas.
a neo-gandhian method
Interpreting Gandhi’s ideas more 
than a century after his first major work 
was written poses two challenges. First, as 
someone who insisted that ‘my life is my 
message’ there are no texts making out his 
arguments to an academic audience. What 
we have to function with is a hundred 
volumes of  his Collected Works, consisting 
of  writing targeted at a wide range of  
audiences from children and homemakers to 
political leaders. Any consistent framework 
to be drawn from these volumes must then 
be put together by those reading these 
volumes. These interpretations, particularly 
among his followers, have often focused 
on the lifestyles he advocated rather than 
the tools of  his social analysis. In order to 
gain the benefits of  Gandhi’s insights into 
socio-political processes it is necessary 
to shift the focus to the instruments he 
used to understand society. This would 
involve constructing a methodological 
framework for understanding society based 
on Gandhi’s writings; an exercise that 
involves bringing together diverse elements 
of  Gandhi’s thought from different places 
in the hundred volumes of  his Collected 
Works.
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The second chal lenge l ies  in 
addressing the situational dimension of  
Gandhi’s thought. This is clearly a critical 
component of  Gandhi’s thought and is 
indeed what brought us to his ideas in our 
search for an explanation for the disorder 
in India. But by its very nature an analysis 
of  a situation in a part of  a large country 
in the early twentieth century cannot be 
simply transferred into situations prevailing 
in the early twenty-first century. We need 
to distinguish between the instruments of  
analysis that he used and the judgements 
about specific situations that he made. 
Continuing with his judgements poses 
serious difficulty both because of  the 
change in the situations as well as the fact 
that they were the product of  Gandhi’s 
unique personality. There is thus little to be 
gained by adhering strictly to his individual 
judgements and prescriptions for specific 
situations. What can have a longer term 
value is the method he used to understand 
specific situations.
What we need to do then is to 
construct a methodological framework 
based on Gandhi ’s  thought.  This 
framework, as we shall see in a while, 
would recognise a role for judgements, but 
would not treat Gandhi’s prescriptions and 
judgements to be the only ones available. 
What we are looking for then is the method 
Gandhi would have used to understand 
specific situations, and not the judgements 
he would have made in coming up with 
his diagnosis of  that situation. This is 
not entirely unlike the argument that 
doctors trained in the same method of  
diagnosis can still, for a variety of  reasons 
including limits on available information, 
come up with different judgements and 
prescriptions.
At the core of  this adoption of  a 
diagnostic method in social analysis is a 
need to consider all the factors that could 
have an impact on a given situation. Such 
an inclusive approach does not leave much 
room for a single all-explaining general 
theoretical model. Gandhi’s scepticism 
about grand ideological models, at a 
time when ideological politics was quite 
dominant across the world, was based on 
his belief  that “it is not possible to enunciate 
one grand principle and leave the rest to 
follow of  itself ” (Gandhi, 1958-1993,Vol 
88, p 59). This is not to be mistaken for a 
complete rejection of  theory or models. 
Theoretical models are useful abstractions 
that could help understand specific process 
at work in a situation. But the role of  each 
such model could change from situation to 
situation. There could be situations where 
the processes captured by a particular 
model would be overwhelming, leaving 
little room for any other factors to come 
into play. In such cases the model would 
appear to be comprehensive and providing 
all the explanations that are needed. In 
other situations the same model could be 
less relevant, and the processes it captures 
could be overwhelmed by contradictory 
processes. To cite an example from 
common sense, gravity would explain why 
a pencil falls to the floor when dropped, 
but it does not prevent an aircraft from 
taking to the air. There are social situations 
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that can be completely explained by class 
conflict just as in others an individual’s 
response to the market may overwhelm 
the dynamics of  class conflict. Rather 
than posing these situations as evidence of  
contradictory theories, the neo-Gandhian 
method would treat them as varied 
situations requiring different diagnosis 
and prescriptions. The analysis would then 
begin with an assessment of  the situation.
In analysing the dynamics of  a 
situation Gandhi provided primacy for 
action. Gandhi endorsed a concept of  
action that he found in his interpretation 
of  the Bhagvad Gita. “Karma means any 
action, any bodily activity or motion. In 
the Gita’s definition of  the word, however, 
Karma includes even thought. Any motion, 
any sound, even breathing, are forms of  
karma. Some of  them we cannot avoid 
performing. Some of  them we perform 
as a matter of  necessity. Some others are 
involuntary” (Gandhi, 1958-1993, Vol 32, 
148). This broad definition of  action goes 
beyond seeing actors as primarily a part of  
a network. It provides a framework that 
allows for the inclusion of  any activity that 
could influence a situation.
An action in a particular situation can 
then be seen as the result of  the urge to act 
and the process of  carrying out that action. 
The urge to act is primarily dependent on 
aspects of  knowledge, which includes three 
elements. First, there is what we know. 
This varies from individual to individual 
and across time. Second, there are the 
elements of  what we know that we bring 
to bear on a particular action. This choice 
can be the result of  variety of  influences 
at the personal and social level. The media, 
for instance, can play a significant role in 
deciding what aspects of  what we know 
we choose to bring to bear on a particular 
situation. And third, there is the subjective 
element in knowledge. If  we go by the 
Duhem-Quine thesis any experiment is an 
evaluation not just of  the hypothesis but 
also of  other factors such as the equipment 
used (Sawyer, Beed, & Sankey, 1997). 
There is thus an element of  judgement in 
deciding that the influence of  these other 
factors on the result of  the experiment is 
not significant. The role for the subjective 
in knowledge in a neo-Gandhian method 
would not stop at such elements. The 
subjective element of  knowledge would 
also extend to the questions we choose 
to ask.
The treatment of  knowledge that 
develops an urge to act is not unconnected 
to the process of  carrying out the action. 
The choice of  the means to carry out 
an action is influenced by the treatment 
of  knowledge. If  we believe that the 
knowledge we possess is the absolute truth 
there would be a tendency to be intolerant 
of  other viewpoints. At best there would 
be belief  that there is a need to educate 
others about the absolute truth. Again, if  
our knowledge is conceived in terms of  
systems and there is a case made out to 
move from one social system to another, 
it could be argued that the change should 
be made as rapidly as possible without 
worrying too much about the costs of  
the transition. This is the certainty that 
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underlies most revolutions, whether it is of  
the communist kind or the case for shock 
therapy in post-communist Russia. Here 
again a great deal depends on the subjective 
approaches to knowledge and the process 
of  implementing an action. 
This critical role for knowledge 
contributed to Gandhi providing a 
prominent place in his writings for his 
concept of  truth. Built into his idea that 
‘truth is God’ was the belief  that while 
an absolute truth does exist it was not 
accessible in its totality to the ordinary 
mortal. What we had to function with 
then was relative truth (Gandhi, 1993). 
Gandhi’s idea of  relative truth is perhaps 
best understood in comparison to Popper’s 
idea of  science. Popper used falsifiability 
to demarcate science from non-science, 
and then made a case for focusing on 
science alone. Relative truth would then, 
like science, be based on rationality or what 
Gandhi chose to refer to as reason. The 
demarcation between science and non-
science would then broadly correspond to 
Gandhi’s distinction between reason and 
faith. But unlike Popper, Gandhi could 
not limit himself  to reason alone. Since 
his method was built around the primacy 
of  action, and people acted even in the 
absence of  complete knowledge, actions 
could have elements of  both reason and 
faith. All that Gandhi would insist on was 
that reason must always have precedence 
over faith.
The use of  the term faith could be 
interpreted to mean a specific religion, 
especially since Gandhi was a deeply 
religious person. But that could be a very 
limited understanding of  faith. There 
is reason to believe Gandhi provided a 
much wider interpretation of  the term. 
In any case, since our concern here is not 
so much an evaluation of  Gandhi’s ideas 
as an attempt to put together a consistent 
method, it would be more rewarding to 
treat faith as a belief  that allows us to act 
even when there is still an element of  doubt 
in the knowledge underlying that action. 
The nature of  this faith will necessarily 
vary from individual to individual, as how 
one deals with doubt has an element of  
subjectivity built into it.
The room for alternative reactions 
to doubt should ensure that all subjective 
judgements cannot be treated equally. The 
challenge for a scientific analysis would 
not just be to reduce subjectivity but to 
improve the quality of  subjectivity that 
cannot be done away with. The quality of  
subjectivity would be influenced by at least 
two other influences. First, all individuals 
are not the same. Gandhi endorsed 
the view available in traditional Indian 
philosophy that there are three gunas: 
the pure, the passionate and the dark. He 
argued that “All three exist in us. We should 
make a special effort to cultivate that which 
we want to strengthen” (Gandhi, The 
Bhagavad Gita, 1996, p. 245). The infinite 
combinations of  the various degrees to 
which these three gunas are present in an 
individual influence several dimensions of  
an individual, including the quality of  her 
subjective judgements. Second, the mere 
existence of  doubt does not mean anything 
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is possible. We may have a doubt as to 
whether A or B would happen, which does 
not make C equally likely; at a certain point 
at sea level on the equator we may doubt 
whether it would rain or not, but that does 
not make it equally likely that it will snow.
The variety of  subjective judgements 
possible makes it necessary to also take on 
board at least some of  the major influences 
on the way subjectivity is used. It is here 
that Gandhi’s concept of  Swadeshi gains 
particular significance. The concept has 
been identified in popular discourse with 
the particular use to which it was put in the 
Indian nationalist movement: a demand 
for protection against imports. But when 
Gandhi chose to define it in 1916 he 
provided a more abstract statement that 
was not directly linked to territorial issues: 
“After much thinking, I have arrived at a 
definition of  Swadeshi that perhaps best 
illustrates my meaning. Swadeshi is that 
spirit in us which restricts us to the use 
and service of  our immediate surroundings 
to the exclusion of  the more remote” 
(Gandhi, 1958-1993, Vol. 13, p 219). Since 
he said this in an address to Christian 
missionaries and does not refer to territory 
we can take it that it was meant to refer to 
a wider context than just territory; it could 
mean our immediate cultural surroundings, 
linguistic surroundings and the like. In 
terms of  the requirements of  a neo-
Gandhian method we can take Swadeshi 
to mean the tendency in us to prefer our 
immediate geographical, cultural, linguistic 
and other surroundings when acting in the 
midst of  doubt.
This view of  Swadeshi increases its 
role in times of  uncertainty. When we 
enter situations of  greater uncertainty 
and doubt we would tend to seek out 
ideas and individuals who are closest to 
our immediate surroundings. A systematic 
consolidation of  individuals who share 
similar immediate surroundings could 
generate three trends: these individuals 
could identify themselves as belonging 
to that group; they could be seen to be 
belonging to that group; and over time a 
discourse could emerge about that group. 
The existence of  these three conditions 
would see them gaining a social identity 
in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s sense of  
the term (Appiah, 2007). Societies going 
through periods of  uncertainty would then 
see increasing awareness of  identities. To 
the extent that individuals have a plurality 
of  immediate surroundings based on their 
territory, their language, their religion, 
and much else, there could be a plurality 
of  identities. The dominant identity 
could then be determined by the nature 
of  uncertainty in a particular situation. 
Coping with a social conflict around 
religion could see individuals seeking their 
immediate religious surroundings and 
hence emphasizing their religious identity; 
class conflict could see the strengthening 
of  class identities, and so on.
As individuals try to protect their 
interests, either individually or as parts of  
identity groups, they can come up against 
individuals and groups with other interests. 
These conflicts can emerge at different 
levels, including those between individuals 
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as independent members of  society, those 
between individuals within an identity 
group, those between individuals across 
different identity groups, those between 
identity groups, and so on. When capturing 
each of  these conflicts the appropriate 
unit of  analysis would itself  vary. Those 
conflicts that have a prominent place for 
the individual would require the individual 
to be the unit of  analysis. At the same 
time while identity groups consist of  
individuals, they could have a dynamic 
of  their own. They would have their own 
demands and aspirations. It is possible that 
in some social situations individuals who 
have previously identified with one identity 
group may choose to identify with another. 
But the identity group would not be able 
to change the demands it raises as easily. 
A class conscious society may suddenly 
be struck by a spate of  communal riots. 
A group that remains loyal to its class 
identity would then lose relevance, but 
its demands would strictly speaking not 
change. Such situations would be better 
understood by focussing on identity 
groups rather than individuals. Thus the 
choice of  the appropriate unit of  analysis 
is itself  dependent on the situation that is 
being analysed.
The emergence of  such conflicts of  
interests between individuals and groups 
leads to a search for a consensus that 
all parties can live with. We can see the 
process of  searching for such a consensus 
as negotiations. Ideally these negotiations 
would be carried out through formal 
institutions that allow for the representation 
of  all viewpoints and interests. But these 
negotiations need not always be formally 
recognised as such. The arguments in 
such negotiations need not also always 
be expressed verbally; they could be done 
through mass mobilization and displays 
of  anger on the streets. In understanding 
these various negotiations in search of  
a consensus, the neo-Gandhian method 
would focus on three major instruments 
that each party could use. The first major 
instrument is the empowerment of  the 
individual or the group. This empowerment 
could come from a variety of  sources. It 
could be the result of  the economic capital 
that an individual or group has access to. It 
could also be the ability to mobilize large 
numbers in the political space. Social and 
cultural capital can also contribute to the 
empowerment of  an individual or group. 
The second instrument in negotiations is 
the availability of  options. An employee 
of  an information technology firm could 
increase her ability to bargain for a higher 
salary if  she has the option of  getting 
another job. The third instrument is that of  
fairness. The need for fairness can increase 
the moral pressure that is often exerted in 
a negotiation. Even in the most militant 
conflicts there is the argument that one 
side has been treated unfairly.
The nature of  these negotiations 
would vary depending on the space they 
take place in. Once we take on board the 
idea that human actions have both an 
objective component that is based entirely 
on rationality, as well as a subjective 
component where Swadeshi, or the 
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preference for immediate surroundings, 
can play a role, it becomes important 
to distinguish between perceptible 
space and imperceptible space. There 
is of  course now a wide recognition 
that space goes far beyond its physical 
characteristics. Following Lefvebre 
(Lefvebre & Nicholson-Smith, 1991) there 
has been considerable interest in the social 
production of  space. This in turn has led to 
greater attention being paid to public space, 
and what would make it more democratic 
(Habermas, 1991). Even as this discussion 
takes space well beyond its physical 
dimensions much of  this work remains 
within the realm of  what is perceptible. 
The effort has largely been to perceive 
the working of  power, race, gender, and 
other influences, on a given space. This 
space can be understood within the strict 
norms of  rationality. There is however also 
another space, one that is imperceptible. 
This is the space that is created by our 
loyalty to our immediate surroundings. 
As in the case of  the Gandhian version 
of  Swadeshi the immediate surroundings 
here are not confined to the territorial 
dimension, but extend to other elements 
like culture and intellectual identities. This 
loyalty is primarily determined by a sense 
of  association, more than rationality. And 
this space too can be contested. A typical 
example of  a contestation of  imperceptible 
space is the debate in France over the right 
of  Muslim women to wear headscarves. 
The loyalty to a religious culture that leads 
to these acts is essentially imperceptible. 
All that can be seen here is the occasional 
consequence of  this loyalty, such as when 
a Muslim woman defies the ban and wears 
a headscarf. Again, the role of  self-respect 
in the building of  an identity in India is 
essentially imperceptible. Its magnitude 
is only seen when it leads to specific acts 
like a self-respect movement. Thus while 
perceptible space is best understood 
in rational terms, imperceptible space 
requires a greater role for Swadeshi, or our 
preference for our immediate surroundings 
over the more remote. 
Within these spaces the negotiations 
could be carried out in a variety of  arenas. 
Places where knowledge is generated, 
ranging from educational institutions 
to playgrounds, could all be arenas for 
negotiation. Again there are arenas which 
determine the choice of  particular bits of  
knowledge that get used in a negotiation. 
These arenas range from the media to 
cultural institutions. Negotiations can 
occur in different specific arenas even 
for a similar conflict. A wage negotiation 
that is built around the empowerment of  
workers would, more often than not, take 
place within the workplace. This would be 
particularly true when workers use a strike 
to strengthen their case. At the same time 
a wage negotiation based on exploring 
alternative job options could well take place 
in a pub. The arenas of  imperceptible space 
are by their very nature more difficult, 
even impossible, to explore in detail, but 
it is possible to identify acts that can affect 
negotiations in that space. Tearing down 
the flag associated with a particular identity 
group or throwing carcasses in front of  a 
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place of  worship have all been known to 
generate riots in India.
By their very nature these negotiations 
do not always result in an ideal situation. 
Those with greater empowerment and 
options could enforce an outcome that is 
not fair. Such outcomes may be accepted 
only because a fairer outcome is not 
realizable. Once an outcome is accepted 
it would generate certain practices. In our 
wage negotiations at the workplace example 
it would formalize work commitments that 
have been agreed upon. Over time it would 
create a regular practice of  individuals 
negotiating at the workplace and then 
following the commitments that have been 
agreed upon. This repeated acceptance of  
a practice with a role for specific individuals 
would meet Rom Harre’s definition of  an 
institution “as an interlocking double-
structure of  persons-as-role-holders or 
office-bearers and the like, and of  social 
practices involving both expressive and 
practical aims and outcomes” (Harre, 
1979, p. 98). Similarly, even the process 
of  meeting in pubs to seek out alternative 
jobs would be an institution.
A neo-Gandhian method would 
then trace the actions of  individuals and 
identity groups and the negotiations they 
generate to arrive at a bargained consensus. 
The practices the bargained consensus 
throws up would then form the basis for 
institutions. A society where a bargained 
consensus has been accepted for a period 
of  time would be a stable one. But this 
stability could falter with changes at each 
stage in the process. If  there is a change 
in the empowerment of  individuals and 
identity groups, or a change in the options 
available, or a moral transformation that 
results in a new sense of  fairness, the 
existing bargained consensus would be 
challenged. And even if  a fresh bargained 
consensus is arrived at, it need not be 
consistent with the existing institutions. A 
gap between existing institutions and what 
is accepted on the ground would generate 
demands for institutional transformation.
the method and the city
When we put the neo-Gandhian 
method to use in understanding cities, an 
area that immediately comes into focus is 
the role of  identities. In whatever way we 
choose to define a city there is a significant 
place for its size and density of  population. 
In such a larger arena an individual can 
find herself  in a position to activate a 
multiplicity of  her social identities. The 
city allows for the emergence of  multiple 
identity groups. Each group provides an 
opportunity for the individual to identify 
with that group, be identified as belonging 
to it, and be a part of  a general discourse 
around that identity, thereby meeting 
Appiah’s requirements for a social identity. 
And an individual need not be confined to a 
single social identity. She can adopt a social 
identity that is global at her workplace, 
and spend the evening being a part of  a 
local social identity associated with, say, a 
football club. When an individual moves 
seamlessly from one identity to another 
reflecting all the facets of  her personality 
she can explore all the dimensions of  her 
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individuality. Such a seamless movement 
between social identities would be possible 
when the institutional practices associated 
with each identity are well established 
and stable. Cities that allow for the full 
expression of  individuality are then 
typically those that have established and 
largely unchallenged social practices.
Not all cities are however characterised 
by a stable set of  social practices. Even 
cities that have stable social practices for 
some time need not have them always. 
Cities in the midst of  a transformation can 
find new groups being empowered at the 
cost of  others. Technological change can 
result in the emergence of  new options 
for individuals even as it could lead to 
the demise of  earlier options. The rise of  
information technology has transformed 
the character of  several cities. Sometimes 
social change can be accompanied by new 
moral norms and consequently changes 
in the idea of  what is fair. Such times of  
change can increase the level of  uncertainty 
that an individual faces. Her association 
with a social identity need not then be 
confined to treating it as a means of  
expressing an aspect of  her individuality. 
She may also seek security from the group 
of  others associated with that identity. A 
time of  social conflict, even when it is not 
violent conflict, may generate sufficient 
uncertainty, even fear, in an individual to 
a point where she would find it necessary 
to tap whatever sense of  security being 
in a group with a shared identity can 
provide. Cities in India that have witnessed 
communal conflict have been known to 
see communities tending to live together 
in closely knit colonies. Cities of  greater 
uncertainty, or phases when cities go 
through greater uncertainty, are then more 
likely to see the rise of  identity groups in 
the social and political space. To the extent 
that these identities are built by invoking 
loyalty to one’s immediate surroundings, it 
provides a greater role for imperceptible 
space. At times of  communal strife in 
countries like India the negotiations take 
place in imperceptible space before they 
are revealed in, say, the choice of  areas of  
residence.
Individuals and identity groups can 
often act in ways that seek to enhance 
their role in both the perceptible and 
imperceptible spaces. In the process they 
may be forced into negotiations with 
other individuals and identity groups. 
A significant part of  these negotiations 
can relate to defining the boundaries that 
individuals and identity groups would like 
to draw. These boundaries can range from 
those that are primarily concerned with the 
requirements of  an individual, such as the 
need for privacy, to those that delimit the 
public sphere where there should ideally 
no limits for any individual or group. While 
these boundaries are sometimes linked to 
a specific geographical spaces within a city 
that need not always be the case. As Saskia 
Sassen has argued, we can distinguish 
between two kinds of  boundaries, “One is 
that the border is embedded in the product, 
the person, and the instrument: a mobile 
agent endogenizes critical features of  the 
border. The other is that there are multiple 
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locations for the border” (2008, p. 416). 
While the latter is linked to a particular 
territory, the first is not. The mobile 
boundaries can be quite striking in cities 
in the developing world, as in the case of  
individuals in luxury cars driving through 
areas of  stark poverty.
In this  s i tuat ion of  mult iple 
negotiations, a bargained consensus, if  
it exists, can be quite fragile. A change in 
any of  the three elements of  negotiation 
could break it. The empowerment of  
particular social groups within a city could 
be dramatically transformed by a variety 
of  factors. The influx of  capital into a city 
could find fresh demands on perceptible as 
well as imperceptible space. While much of  
the negotiations for land and power are in 
the perceptible space, the negotiations to 
redefine what the values the city identifies 
itself  with are often in the imperceptible 
space until the results of  the negotiations 
are visible. Similarly, though at the other 
end of  the economic spectrum, a massive 
burst of  migration of  labour could also 
generate fresh negotiations in both the 
perceptible and imperceptible spaces. Even 
as their struggle to find a livelihood in the 
city will alter negotiations in the perceptible 
space, their negotiations with the fears of  
moving into the city will largely remain in 
the imperceptible space. Again, the options 
available in a city are also not unchanging. 
Economic options could change with a 
transformation in the economy for better 
or for worse. A number of  factors could 
change the social options too. A change 
in the sex ratio, either due to migration or 
female foeticide, cannot but have dramatic 
social consequences. And the morality 
accepted by different individuals or groups 
in the city is not unchanging either. 
The impact on the city would depend 
not only on the results of  these multiple 
negotiations but also on the processes of  
negotiations. Cities where empowerment is 
enhanced through access to violence would 
necessarily face the adverse consequences 
of  the process, even if  a bargained 
consensus is finally reached. And after 
bargained consensuses are reached, it 
remains to be seen whether the practices 
they create are consistent with existing 
institutions. If  they are not, much would 
depend on the ability of  the city to change 
the nature of  its institutions.
Bargaining in indian cities
When understanding Indian cities it 
is important to place them in the context 
of  urbanization. At last count — the 2011 
Census of  India — less than a third of  
India’s population lived in urban areas. 
It is possible to find fault with these 
official figures and make a case that they 
underestimate the extent of  urbanisation. 
But even after making these adjustments, 
it is difficult to ignore the fact that a 
majority of  India’s population still lives in 
villages. This dominant rural context is not 
without its influence on the country’s cities. 
Significant sections of  the inhabitants 
of  India’s cities retain a connection with 
their village for at least two reasons. First, 
these connections are built into the nature 
of  migration from the rural to the urban. 
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It has been shown that families do not 
typically move from the village to the 
city in one unit. The man tends to move 
first. After he has found employment the 
wife joins him. If  the wife is able to find 
employment, they usually prefer to leave 
the child with the extended family in the 
village until she is old enough to take care 
of  herself  in the urban environment (Pani 
& Singh, 2012). This extended process 
of  migration ensures a sustained link 
between the inhabitants of  cities and their 
villages. Second, the connections are also 
protected because the family in the village 
can play the role of  a safety net to the 
urban migrant. When they lose theirjobs 
in a city with a high cost of  living and have 
difficulty finding another soon enough, 
they could return to the relatively low 
cost existence of  their villages (Bhowmik 
& More, 2002). Even when this option is 
not exercised, the fact that it exists acts as 
a safety net.
The process of  urbanization is 
also not evenly spread out. There are 
states like Tamil Nadu where the process 
has gathered considerable momentum 
with close to half  its population living 
in urban areas in 2011, in contrast to 
states like Bihar where only a little over 
a tenth of  its population was living in 
urban areas in that year(Census of  India, 
2011, Provisional Population Tables). 
These uneven processes of  urbanization 
encourage migration across the country, 
sometimes from the relatively backward 
states of  the north and the east to the 
relatively better developed ones in the 
south and the west. The distances involved 
in this migration does not completely 
remove the temporariness of  the process. 
At times of  urban distress or tensions there 
is a tendency to return quickly to the place 
of  origin even if  the distance involved is 
several thousand kilometres. In August 
2012 there were rumours in the south 
Indian city of  Bangalore that there would 
be attacks on migrants from the northeast 
of  the country. Though no such incident 
was actually reported the fear of  the attacks 
saw tens of  thousands of  migrants from 
the northeast fleeing Bangalore (Srivatsa 
& Kurup, 2012). 
This vast and diverse process will 
necessarily throw up very different 
situations. The emergence of  identity 
groups, the creation of  perceptible and 
imperceptible spaces, and the negotiations 
in these spaces would all vary quite 
substantially across different situations. A 
meaningful analysis would take the neo-
Gandhian method to specific situations. 
We can then return to the issue we started 
out with: the identity and gender related 
crisis, using the case of  the Indian capital 
of  Delhi.
The city of  Delhi has been a centre 
of  power in India for many centuries, 
extending long before the colonial era. In 
the process the city has been shaped and 
reshaped by multiple imaginations backed 
by the resources and power to enforce 
whatever the imaginations demanded. As 
the city has grown it has engulfed villages 
as well as sites of  historic significance. 
The grandeur of  the plans for the city 
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reflected the confidence of  its rulers, past 
and present, feudal and democratic, which 
was not always equalled by the quality of  
planning. As the planners focused their 
attention of  what had to be constructed 
they did not always have time for the 
needs of  those who were carrying out the 
constructions, especially migrant labour. 
“Thus the building of  planned Delhi” as 
Baviskar points out, “was mirrored in the 
simultaneous mushrooming of  unplanned 
Delhi” (Baviskar, 2003). This process has 
had its effects on the identity groups the 
city has thrown up.
Among the multitude of  identity 
groups in the city there are three broad 
categories that deserve closer attention 
for the purposes of  the phenomenon we 
are trying to understand. First, there are 
the identity groups that are related to the 
rural. These groups includes both those 
who have come to the city — the migrants 
— as well as those the city has gone out to, 
that is, the villages that have been absorbed 
into the city. Often the migrants, for want 
of  better options, live in the villages that 
have been absorbed into the city. This leads 
to the emergence of  a variety of  identity 
groups that bring the rural ethos into the 
city. Second, there is the labour that has 
been brought to construct the city. The 
extremely difficult conditions they have 
to live in ensure that this activity attracts 
primarily those who are among the most 
depressed in the rural areas. As the most 
depressed in rural India are often Dalits 
there is a broad caste identity that brings 
these groups together. The third set of  
identity groups can, for want of  a better 
word, be termed ‘urbane’. These groups 
are dominated by the ascendant middle 
class that is comfortable with a role in 
influencing state policy. These groups can 
include a wide set of  individuals including 
those in the bureaucracy, the media, 
academia, and possible even a section of  
activists. 
These three sets of  groups negotiate 
to define borders in both the perceptible 
and imperceptible spaces. In the perceptible 
space the conflict is largely over what 
happens on specific pieces of  land. This is 
not just a matter of  a battle for ownership, 
though that is undoubtedly important. It is 
also a matter of  how others use land. For 
several ‘urbane’ identity groups the idea of  
squatter colonies dotting their well-planned 
metropolis is unacceptable. Efforts are 
consistently on to remove them. In the 
imperceptible space the battles are often 
over issues related to self-respect and pride. 
For those who have little to gain in the 
perceptible space, the imperceptible space 
becomes even more critical. As the Dalit 
construction workers live in fear of  their 
hutments being demolished, they rely more 
on the imperceptible space their identity 
group provides. It becomes important to, 
say, construct and defend an Ambedkar 
statue, if  need be with their lives.
The course of  negotiations in both 
spaces is influenced by the empowerment 
of  the three identity groups, the options 
available to them, and their sense of  
fairness. For the identity groups with a 
strong rural connection the scope for 
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empowerment through economic means 
is somewhat constrained. While the 
higher real estate prices could provide 
some relief  for the landed sections of  
these identity groups most of  them do 
not have the resources to carry out long-
term development on their land. The 
smaller land holders in particular have 
to make do with a one-time benefit from 
their land. The inhabitants of  the villages 
that have been absorbed into the city 
also typically do not have the education 
and other skills needed to do well in the 
urban environment. Those who had a 
dominant status in the village hierarchy, in 
particular, find it difficult to find a social 
place in the city that provides a comparable 
status. There is then an effort to try and 
rebuild that status through a display of  
conspicuous consumption, often wiping 
out much of  the money realized from the 
one-time deal on their land.
This trend has had a major impact on 
gender relations. Marriages are traditionally 
the time when the family displays its 
economic and social status to the society 
at large. With their social status eroded 
by the city, the focus is on demonstrating 
their economic status. This has increased 
the costs involved in weddings (Anderson, 
2003). And since this cost is usually borne 
by the bride’s family in addition to the 
payment of  a dowry, it results in a sharp 
spurt in the costs of  bringing up a girl child. 
The patriarchal bias against the girl child 
now gains an economic rationale.
The limited economic options 
available to this group take them towards 
the political space. Democratic politics 
allows this identity group to make use 
of  its numerical superiority. In addition 
to their numbers in the city, they can tap 
their rural connections to find room for 
themselves in caste based politics. The 
competitive nature of  this politics does 
raise the economic costs of  entry. The 
Centre for Media Studies has estimated that 
Indian politicians were expected to spend 
S 5 billion in the 2014 elections (India’s 
spend on elections could challenge US 
record: Report, 2014). With the pursuit of  
state power, directly or indirectly, becoming 
a major and expensive objective, there is 
sometimes less contempt for bending the 
rules of  public office for private gain. 
The Dalit identity groups is in an 
even worse position as far as economic 
empower ment  i s  concer ned .  As 
migrants who have usually escaped the 
extreme distress they face in their rural 
communities, their economic resources are 
extremely limited. Politically too they are 
not as numerous as the identity groups with 
strong rural connections, with Scheduled 
Castes accounting for less than 17 percent 
of  the population of  the urban areas of  the 
National Capital Territory of  Delhi (Census 
of  India, 2011). With lower empowerment 
and fewer options their focus has been 
primarily on the fairness element of  the 
negotiations. They have built a compelling 
case, around the extreme exploitation 
they have had to face for centuries, for 
reservations in the state apparatus. The 
consistent use of  this approach demands 
that they remain cohesive. The loyalty 
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to the identity that is demanded by this 
group provides a prominent place for 
their negotiations in the imperceptible 
space, with activists reacting quickly, and 
sometimes aggressively, to any possibility 
of  their being slighted.
The identity groups with the greatest 
economic empowerment are undoubtedly 
what we have termed the ‘urbane’. The 
much maligned strategy of  public sector 
investment followed in the decades soon 
after independence was not without 
its successes. The public sector and its 
trade unions helped expand the middle 
class (Sridharan, 2004). This class could 
then make use of  public investment in 
education, including technical education. 
The resultant technical manpower benefited 
substantially from the globalization led by 
the communication revolution (Heitzman, 
2004). As jobs in the information 
technology sector grew so did the middle 
class. Some members of  this middle class 
went on to tap the capital markets and the 
global demand for outsourcing to create 
what are now billion dollar companies (Lee 
& Park, 2010). The massive expansion of  
the middle class saw its influence growing 
in a number of  directions including the 
media. The strength of  these ‘urbane’ 
identity groups was consolidated by the 
fact that it retained the option of  moving 
to the developed world. This option could 
be exercised not only by individuals seeking 
employment but also companies seeking 
profitable locations for their business. 
In the aggressive pursuit of  its interests 
a sense of  fairness has not always been 
a priority for several of  these ‘urbane’ 
identity groups.
The negotiations between these three 
sets of  identity groups have had a variety 
of  effects on Delhi, and indeed other 
Indian cities. To cite just one example, 
it has changed the course of  the debate 
on corruption. While the identity groups 
with rural connections were increasingly 
dependent on the political space, the 
‘urbane’ identity groups found it difficult 
to dominate that sphere. It was then in the 
interests of  the ‘urbane’ identity groups 
to focus the nation’s attention entirely on 
the corruption of  the political class. And 
the media did play an important role in 
presenting that message. This and several 
other consequences of  the negotiations 
between the three sets of  identity groups 
that we have identified fall outside the 
purview of  this paper as its focus is on the 
effects of  these negotiations on the gender 
crisis in Delhi.
Gender was not quite a direct issue 
in the negotiation between these identity 
groups. The identity groups with rural 
connections were in the process of  
commercializing patriarchy. The Dalit 
groups were not in a position to challenge 
the decisions of  others, even if  they 
wanted to. And the low priority to fairness 
in most of  the ‘urbane’ identity groups 
meant that the gender issue did not play a 
major role in their discourse. The issue did 
force itself  into national prominence when 
the brutal gang rape that led to the murder 
of  a student in December 2012 brought 
the question of  security for women to the 
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forefront. But the resultant discussion did 
not go far beyond the question of  security 
for women. While this is undoubtedly 
an issue of  critical importance, seeing it 
in isolation ensured that it was treated 
primarily as an issue involving the law 
creation and enforcement agencies. The 
laws on rape were made more stringent 
and the ways of  policing received much 
needed critical attention (Jha, et al., 2013). 
But by treating it as essentially a criminal 
act the social dimension of  the issue 
die not receive too much attention. Not 
surprisingly, later efforts to mobilize the 
public on the issue have received only 
lukewarm response.
While the gender issue may not have 
become a direct bone of  contention in 
the negotiations between the groups, it 
was not without its indirect effects. The 
inability of  the identity groups with rural 
connections to protect their status in 
an urban environment led, as we have 
noted, to the commercialization of  gender 
bias. With the availability of  scanning 
technologies it became possible to actually 
affect the gender ratio. The child sex ratio 
turned adverse quite sharply across urban 
India from 1043 boys per 1000 girls in 
1981 to 1109 boys per 1000 girls in 2011 
(Census of  India, 2011). This trend has had 
its impact on overall sex ratios. As we can 
see in Table 1 the sex ratios measured in 
terms of  number of  men per 1000 women 
tabulated from the 2011 census is adverse 
to the women in rural Uttar Pradesh and 
rural Haryana, the states bordering the 
National Capital Territory of  Delhi. What 
is more worrisome is that the Child Sex 
Ratios in these states are worse than the 
existing sex ratios, suggesting a possible 
strengthening of  the bias against the girl 
child. And when the migrants move from 
the rural areas of  Haryana and Uttar 
Pradesh to Delhi they find a sex ratio that 
is even more adverse. Delhi has more than 
150 extra men for every 1000 women. This 
imbalance is made worse by the limited 
scope for interaction between young men 
and women. A combination of  tradition 
and security concerns has ensured that 
women fear staying out after dark on the 
roads in India’s capital city. The scope for 
even basic interaction is then the workplace. 
Table 1: Sex ratios in the rural areas of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana and the urban areas of the 
National Capital Territory of Delhi
Rural Uttar 
Pradesh
Rural Haryana Urban areas of 
NCT of Delhi
Sex ratio 1089.73 1134.27 1151.57
Child sex ratio 1103.37 1197.18 1145.49
Workplace sex ratio in agriculture 2716.11 4599.40 --
Workplace sex ratio in household industry 1842.93 2595.61 6401.45
Workplace sex ratio in  other economic activities 4196.53 5426.81 6109.91
Source: Tabulated from Census of India, 2011
Note: Sex ratio is calculated as number of males for every 1000 females
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This imbalance has had two visible 
effects. First, it has created conditions 
that make it more difficult to control 
adolescent sexual crimes. In the Delhi 
rape case of  December 2012 one of  
the rapists was a minor. Second, and of  
greater consequence for the longer term 
development of  gender relations in India, 
there is a serious problem of  a shortage 
of  brides in some of  the areas where the 
gender bias has had an impact on sex ratios. 
The shortage of  brides should normally 
see a willingness to relax traditional norms 
in order to make it easier to get a bride for 
their sons. There is in fact some evidence 
of  a relaxation in the rules as far as intra 
gotra marriages are concerned (Larsen & 
Kaur, 2013). But a competition for brides 
is inconsistent with a strong patriarchal 
bias. The more patriarchal caste groups 
have thus moved in the opposite direction. 
Rather than allowing the shortage of  brides 
to alter gender relations, the focus of  some 
caste groups has turned towards gaining 
greater control over the process. They have 
fallen back on identity to try and retain 
control over the brides that are available. 
The enforcement of  the ban on same gotra 
marriages, through brutal means if  need 
be, is an effort by a caste group to retain 
control over marriages in the community, 
and thereby over the availability of  brides.
This process could also have 
consequences that could go beyond the 
gender issue. In the process of  generating 
and enforcing gender related diktats, 
communities have had to fall back on 
traditional dispute solving mechanisms. 
The Khap panchayats carried out by 
elders in the community, usually the elite, 
have regained some of  their traditional 
prominence. These courts that are held 
before the village community summon the 
offending couples and their parents, and 
pronounce judgements that can go against 
the law of  the land (Yadav, 2010). While 
it is much too soon to say whether this 
will develop into a full-fledged alternative 
judicial system, it is worth noting that 
the political class has stayed away from 
criticizing Khap panchayats.
conclusion
As the experience of  cities across the 
world reveals an increasing tendency to 
resist any effort to place them in a general 
theoretical model, the neo-Gandhian 
method allows us to deal with this variety. 
By shifting the focus from a consistent 
model to deal with all situations to a 
consistent method to diagnose individual 
situations it allows us to capture the 
entire range of  situations that cities can 
throw up. The primacy it provides for 
action allows room not just for rational 
thought underlying an action but also 
for the role of  doubt. It recognises the 
subjective element in dealing with doubt, 
developing the concept of  Swadeshi 
to reflect the preference for immediate 
And here the imbalance becomes worse as 
we move from rural occupations to urban 
ones. From a workplace sex ratio of  a 
less than three men for every woman in 
agriculture in Uttar Pradesh the ratio jumps 
to over six in the urban areas of  Delhi.
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surroundings over the more remote. This 
preference contributes to the tendency 
to form identity groups. As individuals 
have multiple identities they would like to 
move from one identity group to another 
depending on the identity that they would 
like to emphasise at a point of  time. Cities 
that allow this to happen are usually stable 
ones where individuals can be part of  so 
many varied identity groups that it would 
appear that identity does not matter. But 
in cities of  greater uncertainty individuals 
tend to move towards identity groups 
that would give them greater protection 
in a crisis.
Individuals and identity groups can 
then bargain for space in the city. Much of  
the bargaining is in the perceptible space 
dominated in cities of  the developing 
world by land and political power. But 
there is also a demand for space that 
is imperceptible; space that allows for 
emotions like self- respect. The importance 
of  imperceptible space increases for 
identity groups that do not have great 
success in the bargaining for imperceptible 
space. These identity groups then pay a 
great deal of  attention to elements that 
appear insignificant in perceptible space 
but are critically important in imperceptible 
space, such as erecting statues.
The city then becomes an arena 
for bargaining between individuals, and 
between identity groups. The course 
the bargaining takes depends on the 
empowerment of  individuals or identity 
groups; the options available to them, 
and the idea of  fairness in that city. As 
these elements are all prone to change, the 
bargaining process is a dynamic one. But 
there are times when a certain consensus is 
accepted even if  everyone does not believe 
it is ideal. As cities create practices around 
these bargained consensuses, they create 
the basis for institutions.
The disorder that we see around 
urban India is aided by disconnect between 
the negotiations of  changing cities and 
institutions that reflect the bargained 
consensus of  an earlier era. The frequent 
absence of  authority cannot then be 
treated as just bureaucratic or political 
inefficiency in implementing the rule of  
the law. The inability of  these institutions 
to provide a platform for negotiations 
taking place on the ground often results 
in identity groups taking their argument 
to the streets, sometimes with violent 
consequences. The neo-Gandhian method 
allows us to focus on this gap between 
negotiations and institutions as a major 
cause of  the disorder in Indian cities.
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